Surely, by now, you know the drill. The price of COMEX Digital Silver rallies. Price breaks key technical level. Banks then increase the float of available contracts. Price stalls. Price crashes. Wash. Rinse. Repeat.

On the chart, it looks like this:

So The Banks increased the total float by 45,000 contracts on the way up and have decreased it by 35,000 contracts on the way down. So where did these 45,000 contracts, representing 225,000,000 ounces of digital silver, come from? That's easy. FantasyLand! The Banks, with no intention to ever deliver any actual physical silver, create digital silver from nothing. They then sell the contracts to Spec hedge and trading funds, which purchase these derivatives on margin and with no intention of ever demanding physical delivery of actual silver. These funds only seek "silver exposure".

(You should now ask yourself: "Since that's the case, how is the trading of these fraudulent contracts allowed to determine the physical price? Good question.)

On January 3rd, COMEX Digital Silver broke up and through its 200-day moving average. The Spec trading and hedge funds got all excited and demanded more COMEX silver exposure. The Banks, confident that they'd never be asked to deliver any actual metal (and supremely confident that they could win this game again), issued new contracts to meet the Spec demand.

And this is Econ 101. If the supply of any good increases by the same percentage as the demand for said good, price should remain constant. (This comprehensive explanation from two years ago:

And why do The Banks continue to play these games with price? That's easy. PROFIT! Let's just say that JPMorgan alone added 20,000 of the 40,000 contracts in January. With their 150,000,000 ounces in the vault, they could short up to 30,000 contracts on The COMEX and theoretically call it a "hedge". Let's say their average short point in January was $15.90/oz. (I don't know. I'm just guessing off of the chart). And now, over the last week, they've closed out these shorts, buying them back as The Specs rushed for the exits, particularly after the 50-day and 200-day were broken back on Friday. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that the average cost to buy back and cover these 20,000 contracts was $15.40

This would mean that JPM just made 50 on 20,000 contracts, with each contract representing 5,000 ounces. Thus, by this simple example, the prop desk at JPM just made a cool $50,000,000 in a relatively riskless trade... riskless because they have near-complete monopolistic control of the silver COMEX, by virtue of their holding 49% of the total vault.